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Abstract 
The basic patterns of the initial Indonesian party system have reemerged after more than 
four decades of authoritarianism. The cleavage model by Lipset and Rokkan is well-suited 
to analyzing the genesis of and the most salient features of this party system. However, in 
applying the approach, some adjustments have to be made. For instance, the national and 
industrial revolutions have to be conceived of differently. Moreover, it is useful to distin-
guish critical phases in the formation of parties. The four cleavages have to be reinter-
preted and additional ones need to be identified. In Indonesia, economic cleavages are 
hardly significant in conflicts between political parties (especially the “capital” versus “la-
bour” cleavage) or are expressed in terms of religion or allegiance to political leaders 
based in a specific region (“urban” versus “rural”). In addition, in comparison with 1999 
and particularly with the 1950s, today’s cleavages are less marked. Thus, the Lipset-
Rokkan model has to be combined with other approaches which underline the importance 
of clientelism and the dealignment of parties. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Die Entwicklung von Konfliktlinien im Parteiensystem Indonesiens 
Grundlegende Strukturen des indonesischen Parteiensystems haben sich nach über vier 
Jahrzehnten autoritärer Herrschaft erneut herausgebildet. Zur Analyse der Entwicklung 
und der wichtigsten Merkmale dieses Parteiensystems ist das Cleavage- oder Konfliktlini-
enmodell von Lipset und Rokkan gut geeignet. Bei der Anwendung dieses Ansatzes soll-
ten allerdings einige Anpassungen vorgenommen werden. Die nationale und die industri-
elle Revolution verliefen anders. Zudem ist es wichtig, verschiedene kritische Phasen der 
Parteienbildung voneinander zu unterscheiden. Die vier Konfliktlinien im ursprünglichen 
Lipset/Rokkan-Modell müssen in Indonesien neu konzipiert werden. Ökonomische Cleav-
ages sind entweder von geringer Bedeutung in den parteipolitischen Auseinandersetzun-
gen (insbesondere „Kapital“ versus „Arbeit“) oder werden primär in einer religiösen Be-
grifflichkeit artikuliert („Stadt“ versus „Land“). Konfliktlinien sind heute im Vergleich zu 
1999 und besonders zu den 1950er Jahren weniger deutlich ausgeprägt. Das Modell muss 
daher mit Ansätzen kombiniert werden, welche die Bedeutung klientelistischer Strukturen 
und die sich abschwächende Verwurzelung der Parteien in sozialen Milieus hervorheben. 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years the literature on political parties in Indonesia has focused on the impact of 
social milieus (aliran or “streams”) on voters’ behavior (King 2003; Baswedan 2004; Sherlock 
2005; Johnson Tan 2005; Ufen 2008a) and has investigated dealignment processes (Ufen 
2008a), “cartelization” (Slater 2004), the role of formal institutions (Sherlock 2005), and insti-
tutionalization (Johnson Tan 2005; Tomsa 2006; Ufen 2008b). Most scholars have combined 
rational choice, institutionalist, and sociological approaches (e.g., Johnson Tan 2005; Tomsa 
2006; Mujani and Liddle 2007). In particular, studies on local politics stress the rational cal-
culi of single actors (Haris 2005; Buehler and Johnson Tan 2007; Mietzner 2008). 
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The cleavage approach developed by Lipset and Rokkan has not been applied yet, although 
some indicators suggest that Indonesia, the biggest majoritarian Muslim country in the 
world, would be a suitable case study. As early as the 1950s, a “pillarization” comparable to 
that of the Netherlands occurred there—a unique phenomenon in Asia. Major political par-
ties are rooted in social milieus. This means that societal conflicts are “translated” into the 
party system—just like the process Lipset and Rokkan have described for Western Europe. 
But can we apply the Lipset-Rokkan model wholesale to the Indonesian case, or do we have 
to adapt the approach? And how have the cleavage structure and political parties changed 
in Indonesia? 
In order to answer these questions, the following section outlines the Lipset-Rokkan model 
and the modifications necessary with reference to young democracies. By way of a retro-
spective-diachronic analysis, the main part of the paper reconstructs the development of the 
party system during critical, formative phases: the emergence of the first nationalist organi-
zations and parties, the period immediately after independence, and the re-democratization 
from 1998 on.1 It also traces the evolution of cleavages during these distinct phases. The il-
lumination of the cleavages which existed at the time of rising nationalism sheds light on the 
origins of the party system, while the discussion of the parliamentary democracy in the 
1950s helps to assess key features of the system which still exist. The brief section on the au-
thoritarian New Order regime (1965–1998) explains the illiberal heritage of the contempo-
rary party system. The reconstitution of a democratic multiparty system and the two na-
tional elections, processes which have occurred since the fall of Suharto, allow for a discus-
sion of the current cleavage structure. 
I argue that there are a range of continuities in relation to the 1950s and still some marked 
divides represented by political parties; I also show that there are strong indications of party 
dealignment which necessitate further adjustments to the Lipset-Rokkan model. 
2 The Lipset-Rokkan Model 
The cleavage model was put forward by Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967a; Rokkan 1999). It provided a basis for a historically oriented sociological com-
parison of party systems in Western European democracies. Cleavages arise from funda-
mental social conflicts. They structure the discourse regarding major political questions and, 
as a consequence, shape the patterns of the party system (Flora 1999: 5ff.). Political actors, 
and most notably political parties, institutionalize cleavages. The cleavage structure (Rokkan 
1999: 275ff.) results from the complex relations of cross-cutting and reinforcing cleavages 
and largely defines the setup of a party system—that is, political platforms, the behavior of 
individual parties, and the potential for forming coalitions. 
                                                     
1  I follow Ockey (2005), who has described “multiple transitions” in the evolution of the Thai party system. 
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The specific resolution of these conflicts, especially since the beginning of the nineteenth cen-
tury, has led to the formation of diverse party systems in Europe. In many countries, certain 
structures were “frozen” in the 1920s and have, at least partially, endured until today. Lipset 
and Rokkan differentiate between four cleavages against the background of two revolutions: 
Two of these cleavages are direct products of what we might call the National Revolu-
tion: the conflict between the central nation-building culture and the increasing resis-
tance of the ethnically, linguistically, or religiously distinct subject populations in the 
provinces and the peripheries [...]; the conflict between the centralising, and mobilis-
ing Nation-State and the historically established corporative privileges of the Church 
[...]. Two of them are products of the Industrial Revolution: the conflict between the 
landed interests and the rising class of industrial entrepreneurs [...]; the conflict between 
owners and employers on the one side and tenants, labourers, and workers on the other. 
(Rokkan 1999: 284) 
Although the schematic and, one might say, unnecessary utilization of Parsons’ structural 
functionalist AGIL model renders the cleavage model difficult to apply, the Lipset-Rokkan 
article (1967a) has held a particular appeal for a great number of sociologically oriented 
party researchers. The literature on the cleavage approach (Zuckerman 1975; Randall 2001; 
Zielinski 2002; Deegan-Krause 2007; Erdmann 2007; Grabow and Köllner 2008) has also gen-
erated several important objections: 
- Lipset and Rokkan did not clearly define the term “cleavage”. A range of scholars, such 
as Mair (2006), argue that a cleavage should have three central characteristics: “In the 
first place, a cleavage involves a social division that distinguishes between groups of 
people on the basis of key social-structural characteristics such as status, religion, or eth-
nicity. A cleavage is therefore grounded in a distinct social reality. Second, there must be 
a clear sense of collective identity [...]. Third, a cleavage must find organizational expres-
sion” (Mair 2006: 373). 
- Lipset and Rokkan neglect the influence of formal institutions, for instance, electoral re-
gimes and systems of government. 
- They have little interest in the rational strategic calculations of political actors. However, 
cleavages are not simply “given”; instead, they are frequently reinvented and recon-
structed by these actors (Torcal and Mainwaring 2003; Enyedi 2005). Identities are fluid 
and multifaceted (Erdmann 2007). 
- The theory does not always clarify when cleavages first occur and when and why they 
are “translated” into a party system (Flora 1999: 34ff.). There can be, for example, a harsh 
polarity between “capital” and “labor” without labor parties being formed. 
- Lipset and Rokkan not only use the term “revolutions” but also at times speak of “criti-
cal junctures,” namely, the reformation, referring to the territorial consolidation of the 
state when center-periphery conflicts came to the fore; the national revolution in the nar-
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row sense, that is, post-Napoleonic nation building in which the church and the secular 
state competed, particularly in educational matters; the industrial revolution from 1850 
onwards, which engendered the split between rural-agrarian and urban-industrial inter-
est groups and between workers and owners, respectively; and the international revolu-
tion after 1917, which led to the division of communism and socialism (Rokkan 1999: 
303ff.). In one instance they describe rapid, radical changes; in another, long-ranging, 
structural transformations (Flora 1999: 36ff.). 
Moreover, more recent developments, particularly in Western countries, challenge some of 
the central theses of Lipset and Rokkan. New cleavages have emerged, particularly the an-
tagonism between materialist and post-materialist values, which, for instance, has led to the 
rise of Green parties (Inglehart 1997). Another new cleavage concerns the conflict between 
nationalist protectionists and proponents of globalization (Kriesi 1998; Cole 2005). In addi-
tion, the past few decades have witnessed a dealignment, resulting in a much higher num-
ber of swing voters and decreasing numbers of party members. The much-discussed transi-
tion to cartel and electoral professional parties with shifting relationships between party 
bases and leaderships, the impact of the mass media on election campaigns, and the in-
dividualization of the electorate have all contributed to the erosion of traditional milieus 
(Drummond 2006). 
The analysis of the Indonesian party system has to consider these developments. Therefore, 
in the following discussion the different role of the two revolutions, the specifics of Indone-
sian cleavages, and the impact of dealignment will be discussed. 
3 The Evolution of Cleavages in Indonesia 
3.1 Politicization and Aggregation of Societal Interests in the Nationalist Movement 
The nationalist movement in the Netherlands East Indies only came to life when rapid eco-
nomic change facilitated political mobilization. For example, the demand for indigenous 
skilled labor rose due to the opening up of the country to foreign investments and the crea-
tion of a rubber and oil industry with an orientation towards global markets. Another factor 
was the expansion and differentiation of the Netherlands East Indies’ administrative ma-
chinery. As a result of this process, a new indigenous elite susceptible to Western concepts 
such as “nation” and “democracy” emerged and increasingly imagined the archipelago as 
“Indonesia” (Anderson 1991). This new elite expressed political demands different from the 
predominant millenarian models of the nineteenth century and founded modern organiza-
tions such as parties, trade unions, and business associations (Shiraishi 1990). For example, 
the first mass organization, the Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union), the predecessor of the PSII 
(Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia), was originally a movement consisting of small traders and 
manufacturers with the objective of counterbalancing ethnic Chinese businessmen. 
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Nationalist elites agreed on the lingua franca Malay as the future national language, so that 
linguistic cleavages were greatly weakened. From the beginning, ethnic cleavages, too, had 
only a minor impact on the shaping of the first Indonesian parties. There were some ethnically 
based associations in the early stages of the nationalist movement, but they quickly lost their 
influence to national organizations. An exception was the marginalization of the ethnic Chi-
nese, who were not considered Indonesian (Elson 2005). A cleavage soon divided secularists—
some of whom established the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Party) in 
1927—from supporters of political Islam. Among the latter group there was yet another dis-
tinct cleavage between traditionalists and modernists, which in part expressed, in religious 
terms, an “urban-rural” and a “center-periphery” conflict. The late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth century saw a worldwide spread of Islamic reformism. In Indonesia, the dissemination of 
these ideas entailed the establishment of the urban-based modernist mass organization Mu-
hammadiyah in 1912. As a countermove, the traditionalist Nahdatul Ulama (Renaissance of 
Ulama) was founded in 1926 by Islamic scholars, who—based on a network of Islamic board-
ing schools (pesantren)—were very influential, particularly in Javanese villages. 
Another cleavage between “capital” and “labor,” that is, between the moderate mainstream 
and the burgeoning communist movement, surfaced at the same time. The communist PKI 
(Partai Komunis Indonesia), founded in 1920 as successor to the ISDV (Indische Sociaal-
Democratische Vereeniging, Indies Social Democratic Association) and heavily influenced 
by Dutch socialists, evolved into the largest and best-organized party in the country. It suc-
ceeded in attracting the majority of industrial and agricultural workers, as well as small ten-
ants and worked closely with many of the newly emerging trade unions, all despite the  
fact that, due to Indonesia’s rudimentary industrialization, a proletariat like that in Western 
Europe did not exist. Besides, there was no strong domestic—that is, non-Chinese, non-
Western—group of entrepreneurs or great landowners. Future top politicians, high-ranking 
members of the military, and state officials of the republic based their positions not on land-
ownership or capital but on academic titles and/or the prestige resulting from their partici-
pation in the struggle for national independence (van Niel 1970). For this reason, the Lipset-
Rokkan urban-rural cleavage between industrialists and agricultural elites did not translate 
as easily into the new party system as in other cases. 
Predominance in the nationalist movement moved from the Sarekat Islam over to the PKI 
and then to the PNI. The Sarekat Islam lost much of its appeal after its very successful initial 
years. The PKI, much like the radical nationalists, was politically persecuted by the Dutch 
colonial rulers. Following a failed communist insurgency in 1926/27, radical nationalism was 
even further suppressed in the Netherlands East Indies, so that only moderate nationalist 
coalitions were tolerated. For this reason, fundamental cleavages were hardly represented 
organizationally. 
In 1945, immediately before the first proclamation of the Republic of Indonesia, the national 
elite reached a compromise founded on the “state philosophy” Pancasila (Five Pillars), which 
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respects several monotheistic religions as equal and pronounces de facto a secular state con-
cept. During the debates future president Sukarno envisaged a far-reaching separation of 
“state” and “religion,” whereas the Islamists demanded a constitutional amendment, the “Ja-
karta Charter,” which would force all Muslims to obey shari’a law.2 Furthermore, the elites 
agreed to introduce a liberal democracy with a presidential system of government. The cru-
cial issues were thus effectively decided in favor of the supporters of a secular democracy. 
When in 1945, after a three-year Japanese interregnum, the Dutch returned to their former 
colony, they reclaimed many parts of the archipelago and tried to weaken the young republic 
by means of a “divide and rule” strategy. Political power shifted more and more towards the 
provisional parliament. From 1945 to 1949 Indonesia was a state with limited sovereignty and 
a restricted form of democracy, with relatively weak political parties. The country suffered 
from the guerrilla war against the Dutch and the increasing fragmentation of its territory. The 
bad experiences with the Dutch attempt at establishing a range of independent and compli-
ant states resulted in the thorough centralization of the administrative system in 1949/50. 
3.2 First Democracy (1949–1957) 
The party system in the 1950s was based on aliran (Geertz 1960; Geertz 1963; Hindley 1970; 
Ufen 2008a: 7ff.). These “streams” resemble the pillars that shaped Dutch society in the 1950s 
and 1960s (Schrauwers 2000). This pillarization (verzuiling) in the Netherlands led to the “in-
terlocking between cleavage-specific organizations active in the corporate channel and party 
organizations mobilizing for electoral action” (Rokkan 1977: 142). For nearly a century, Dutch 
society had been divided into three pillars or subcultures: national-liberal-secular (algemene or 
general), orthodox Protestant, and Roman Catholic. The pillars originated from reinforcing 
cleavages. In Indonesia, aliran were clusters consisting of women, youth, religious, profes-
sional, and labor organizations. Members of these clusters usually shared a similar world-
view and would affiliate with one of the parties, which would serve as a unifying core. 
The first, and until 1999 the last, free polls in 1955 reinforced the general identification with 
aliran, during the long-running election campaign. The four most important parties—
together they received four-fifths of the votes (see Table 1)—strengthened more or less de-
liberately the identification with aliran (Feith 1962: 132ff.). In accordance with the ideas of 
American anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1963), one can distinguish between abangan (syn-
cretists and nonorthodox Muslims, respectively) and santri (orthodox Muslims). The nation-
alist party (PNI) represented those abangan who had their origins in the Javanese aristocratic 
culture. They were mostly civil servants and employees, or villagers living as clients under 
the influence of these two groups. The strength of the PNI stemmed partly from the appeal 
of the charismatic President Sukarno, who was loosely affiliated with the party and had 
                                                     
2  The same questions came up in the constituent assembly, the Konstituante (1956-58), which was finally dis-
solved, and during the first post-Suharto years in the People’s Congress (MPR). 
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gained extraordinary popularity with his anti-Western, radical nationalism and his diffuse 
political ideology of the “small people” (marhaenisme). The PKI’s abangan voter base was in 
urban slums or among impoverished peasants and rural workers. The santri, in contrast, 
were split into a modernist and a traditionalist wing. The majority of the traditionalists, 
mostly landowning Islamic scholars (ulama) and their followers, were associated with the 
Nahdatul Ulama. Modernist santri included urban intellectuals, traders, and manufacturers, 
often from the Outer Islands, whose interests were generally represented by the Masyumi 
(Mortimer 1982: 60). 
Table 1: Election Results for the National Parliament (1955) 
Party Percentage Seats Aliran; main clientele 
PNI   22.3   57 Abangan; Java, Bali; predominantly Christian regions 
Masyumi   20.9   57 Santri (modernist Islam); urban; periphery (e.g., Sumatra) 
NU   18.4   45 Santri (traditionalist Islam); rural ; Java 
PKI   16.4   39 Abangan; laborers and small tenant farmers; Java 
Others*   22.0   59  
Total 100.0 257  
Notes: PNI = Partai Nasional Indonesia—Indonesian National Party  
Masyumi = Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia— Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims 
NU = Nahdatul Ulama—Renaissance of Islamic Scholars  
PKI = Partai Komunis Indonesia—Communist Party of Indonesia 
* Inter alia two Christian parties (Parkindo and Partai Katolik) and the Partai Sosialis Indonesia 
Sources: Feith (1962); Hindley (1970). 
Aliran arose from the overlapping of different cleavages. The four “classic” cleavages were 
mirrored in the Indonesian party system. Secularism was represented by the PNI and the 
PKI; Islamism by Masyumi and the NU. The center-periphery divide could be seen in the 
conflict between those parties based on Java (PNI, NU, and PKI) and those with their 
strongest backing in the so-called Outer Islands (among others, Masyumi). The NU was a 
rural-based party; Masyumi was strongest in cities. The electorates of both the PNI and  
the PKI were more diverse in this respect. The capital-labor cleavage was equally complex. 
Whereas the PKI was clearly a party of workers and tenant farmers, the PNI, again, tended 
to attract people from various social strata. 
Despite the relatively high degree of institutionalization of the large parties in the mid-
1950s, the party system turned out to be fragile and suffered from fragmentation and strong 
polarization against the background of an unstable societal situation. Moreover, the military 
increasingly turned into a veto actor and by no means confined itself to security issues. Par-
liamentary democracy eventually came to an end, having been confronted with conflicts on 
all sides: between center and periphery (regionalist movements on peripheral islands),3 be-
                                                     
3  A noticeable center-periphery cleavage emerged shortly after the establishment of a centralized state in 1950. 
Christians on Ambon, for instance, who had long collaborated closely with colonial authorities, attempted to 
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tween Islamists and secularists (most notably in the constituent assembly from 1956 to 1958), 
between the PKI and its middle-class opponents, and between the military and civilians af-
ter the proclamation of martial law (1957). 
3.3 Suppression of Conflicts under Authoritarian Rule (1957–1998) 
During the Guided Democracy (1957–1965) President Sukarno was the first among equals in 
a broad alliance of Muslim leaders, military officers, bureaucrats, and PKI functionaries. He 
banned various parties, including Masyumi, and deprived the parliament and the remaining 
parties of most of their power. In October 1965, the fragile alliance dissolved after an at-
tempted coup, the circumstances of which remain obscure today. Escalating class conflict be-
tween abangan smallholders and landless peasants, many of whom were closely affiliated 
with the PKI, on the one side and santri landowners on the other ended in large-scale massa-
cres of communists in 1965/66. The capital-labor cleavage was the most evident split at the 
time (Wertheim 1969), yet it was also expressed with clear religious overtones. In the wake 
of the massacres Sukarno was gradually marginalized and Suharto established the New Or-
der (1965–1998). This system signified an effort to repress all these conflicts (Robison and 
Hadiz 2004: 46ff., 60ff.). The organicist ideology of a “family state” (negara kekeluargaan) and 
the alleged harmonious unity of entrepreneurs and workers (officially referred to as “em-
ployees”) as well as supervisors and subordinates all effectively legitimated the authoritar-
ian system. This neopatrimonial, military-dominated modernizing regime was extremely 
centralized. The biggest entrepreneurs, usually ethnic Chinese, were bound to politicians, 
bureaucrats, and the military by clientelist ties. Independent trade unions and national 
peasant associations were banned. Regionalist or even secessionist ambitions were nipped in 
the bud. The newly established three-party system was controlled by Golkar (Golongan 
Karya, Functional Groups) (Aspinall 2005: 22ff.). This corporatist assemblage of professional, 
youth and women’s associations was founded and for a long time dominated by the mili-
tary. In its initial years it was barely recognized as a political party. In regular but rigged 
elections Golkar always won more than 60 percent of the votes. The other two parties, the 
secular PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democratic Party), considered to be 
the PNI successor, and the Islamic PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembanguan, United Development 
Party) were both effectively impaired. In fact, the PPP was, judging by its name, not even an 
Islamic party (Ufen 2008a: 11ff.). 
The four cleavages were represented in the party system only shallowly. The PDI was a  
fusion of several parties, including Christian ones, whereas the PPP tried to combine the 
strength of the NU (now a social organization and part of the PPP) and modernist organiza-
tions close to the still-banned Masyumi. The PPP was strongest in regions with a high per-
                                                                                                                                                                     
found an independent Republic of the South Moluccas. In West Java, the Islamist movement Darul Islam 
(Abode of Islam) sought to create an Islamic state and was defeated only in 1962. 
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centage of orthodox Muslims (for instance, Aceh and West Sumatra); the PDI in abangan and 
religious minority areas (for instance, Bali, Flores, and North Sulawesi). In some districts, 
Golkar gained almost 100 percent of votes due to its tight patrimonial networks and authori-
tarian pressures. 
Despite authoritarian rule, a fundamental transformation of social cleavages was still possi-
ble, yet it did not immediately affect the structure of the party system. Indeed, party politics 
came to a standstill at a time when Indonesia experienced an enormous economic metamor-
phosis, from 1966 until the Asian crisis in 1997. At first, the sale of oil and gas engendered an 
economic boom which lasted until the 1980s. Falling oil and gas prices then forced the  
government to press ahead with export-led industrialization. Socioeconomic development, 
rapid urbanization, and the continuous expansion of the educational system gave rise to 
both a primarily urban middle class and a stratum of domestic as well as ethnic Chinese big 
entrepreneurs. 
Long-suppressed conflicts began to emerge in the late 1980s. Illegal strikes, peasant demon-
strations against dubious land acquisitions, and protests by the lower classes against the erec-
tion of high-rise offices and shopping malls all erupted in the 1990s. In 1998, Suharto’s regime 
was overthrown by demonstrating students, parts of the middle class, and the gradually de-
fecting military as well as religious leaders and top politicians (Aspinall 2005: 202ff.). 
3.4 Reconstitution and Transformation of Cleavages since 1998 
Suharto’s downfall in May 1998 enabled radical political reforms and the rise of more than 
two hundred new parties, forty-eight of which participated in the national elections in 1999. 
The results of these elections resemble those of 1955.4 King (2003: 122 ff.), for example, was 
able to demonstrate striking analogies between the poll outcomes of 1955 and 1999. He corre-
lated the results of the largest parties at the district level and revealed continuities indicating 
lasting religious links in particular. These continuities are all the more obvious when com-
pared with the Philippines and Thailand, where clientelist patterns hinder the effective trans-
lation of cleavages into the party system (Ufen 2008b).5 Today, the PAN (Partai Amanat Na-
sional, National Mandate Party), the PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Prosperous Justice 
Party), and the PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang, Crescent and Star Party), among others, have con-
stituencies comparable to that of Masyumi (see Tables 1 and 2). The PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia – Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party - Struggle) is considered to be the PNI 
successor and the PKB originated directly from Nahdatul Ulama. In the most recent debates 
on the party system, the salience of aliran is thus generally acknowledged (King 2003; 
Baswedan 2004), even if only with limitations (Johnson Tan 2005; Sherlock 2005; Tomsa 2006). 
                                                     
4  I am referring to party platforms, interviews with more than 100 politicians and political observers, and the 
analysis of election results. See also: Baswedan (2004); Johnson Tan (2006); Sherlock (2005). 
5  This is also in contrast to most other Asian countries: see McAllister (2007); Dalton and Tanaka (2007). 
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Table 2: Cleavages in the Party System (Largest Parties) 
 Golkar PDI-P PKB PPP PD PK/PKS PAN 
Election results  
(in %) 
22.5 (1999);  
21.6 (2004) 
33.8 (1999);  
18.5 (2004) 
12.6 (1999);  
10.6 (2004) 
10.7 (1999); 
8.2 (2004) 
 
7.5 (2004) 
1.4 (1999);  
7.3 (2004) 
7.1 (1999);  
6.4 (2004) 
1. Center-
Periphery 
stronger on Outer 
Islands (most nota-
bly Sulawesi), also 
West Java 
Java, Hindu Bali, 
Christian regions 
especially East 
and Central Java
relatively 
nonspecific 
Java (Jakarta), 
otherwise non-
specific 
Java and several 
Muslim-
dominated re-
gions on Outer 
Islands 
Java (especially 
Yogyakarta) and 
numerous Mus-
lim-dominated 
regions on Outer 
Islands 
2. State-Church 
(“secularism” ver-
sus “moderately 
politicized Islam” 
versus “Islam-
ism”)  
secular but strong, 
especially modern-
ist Muslim wing  
secular moderately poli-
ticized Islam 
Islamism secular Islamism moderately politi-
cized Islam 
3. Urban-Rural 
(primarily ex-
pressed as “mod-
ernist Islam” ver-
sus “traditionalist 
Islam”) 
nonspecific nonspecific rural, tradition-
alist Islam 
mostly rural, 
modernist Is-
lam, with 
strong tradi-
tionalist 
branch 
urban urban, modern-
ist Islam 
urban, modernist 
Islam 
4. Capital-Labor administrative el-
ites, professionals; 
nonspecific regard-
ing support from 
middle and lower 
classes 
administrative el-
ites, profession-
als; strong sup-
port from lower 
classes 
ulama (often 
owners and 
principals of Is-
lamic boarding 
schools), strong 
support from ru-
ral lower classes 
Muslim elites, 
strong sup-
port from 
lower classes 
professionals, 
mostly middle-
class base 
students and 
professionals; 
mostly middle-
class base 
professionals, 
Muslim elites; 
mostly middle-
class base 
5. Status quo-
reformasi 
mostly status quo reformasi, mostly 
status quo since 
about 2001 
reformasi in spe-
cific policy areas
mostly status 
quo 
reformasi in 
specific policy 
areas 
reformasi in spe-
cific policy areas 
initially reformasi; 
today in specific 
policy areas only 
Notes: Golkar = Partai Golongan Karya—Party of Functional Groups  
PDI-P = Partai Demokrasi Indonesia - Perjuangan—Indonesian Democratic Party - Struggle  
PKB = Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa—National Awakening Party 
PPP = Partai Persatuan Pembangunan—United Development Party  
PD = Partai Demokrat—Democratic Party  
PK = Partai Keadilan—Justice Party, re-founded as PKS = Partai Keadilan Sejahtera—Prosperous Justice 
Party  
PAN = Partai Amanat Nasional—National Mandate Party 
Sources: King (2003); Ananta, Arifin and Suryadinata (2004); Ananta, Arifin and Suryadinata (2005); Sherlock 
(2005); Johnson Tan (2005); Tomsa (2006); Mujani and Liddle (2007). 
Five of the seven largest parties in 1999 were Islamic (PPP, PAN, PKB, PBB [1.9 percent and 
2.6 percent in 1999 and 2004, respectively] and PK), either by name or according to their his-
tory and typical organizational linkages, while the remaining two (Golkar, at least predomi-
nantly, and the PDI-P) were secular in orientation. The PKB and the PAN expressly accept 
non-Muslims as members and voters and place strong emphasis on their secular political ob-
jectives. Yet, with an organizational base consisting predominantly of traditionalist and 
modernist Muslims, respectively, who are usually somehow affiliated with Nahdatul Ulama 
and Muhammadiyah,6 they can in fact be considered Islamic parties. The PPP has a strong 
                                                     
6  See on this the biographical data on parliamentarians: Suryakusuma (1999) and Kompas (2005). 
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moderate Islamic and an equally strong Islamist wing.7 The PDI-P avoids the politicization 
of religious issues, such as the debates surrounding a so-called pornography bill which re-
stricts freedom of press and speech and the introduction of restrictive shari’a-based regula-
tions at the local level. The party is backed by abangans and religious minorities, most nota-
bly Christians and Balinese Hindus (King 1999: 151). 
The elections in 2004 demonstrated broad continuities.8 Exceptions were the losses of the 
PDI-P and, in certain regions, Golkar as well as the rise of two other parties:9 former general 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s new Partai Demokrat (he would win the direct presidential 
elections only a few weeks later) and the firmly organized cadre party PKS (successor to the 
PK). The latter has developed into the most powerful force in several cities, has particularly 
strong links to a milieu of educated young Muslims, and defines itself primarily as Islamist, 
if only in moderate terms. 
All in all, the most salient cleavages structuring the party system are based on religious 
worldviews: “traditionalism versus modernism” and “secularism versus moderate political 
Islam versus Islamism”. Based on the organizational background of parliamentarians 
(Suryakusuma 1999; Kompas 2005), the typical attitude of the party faction in parliament (in 
particular their position on the Jakarta Charter issue),10 the political platform, and the party 
symbolism, the PPP, the PBB, and the PKS are Islamist in orientation. The PAN, the PKB, 
and the PBR (Partai Bintang Reformasi, Star Party of Reform; 2.4 percent in 2004), a PPP 
breakaway party, are moderate Islamic parties, although they have Islamist factions. Golkar, 
as a hybrid, seems to bridge the divide between secularism and Islam (King 1999: 153; 
Tomsa 2006: chapter 5.1). Besides the essentially secular PDI-P, the PDS (Partai Damai Se-
jahtera, Prosperity and Peace Party; 2.1 percent in 2004) is, though not by name, explicitly 
defined as a Christian party. 
The center-periphery cleavage manifests itself in a specific regional distribution of votes 
(Kompas 2004a; Ananta, Arifin and Suryadinata 2005: 39ff.; Sherlock 2005; Johnson Tan 2005). 
The cleavage had already intensified during the 1950s due to the centralized structure of the 
polity and became clearly manifest in the party system. Today, parties such as Golkar are 
highly influential in peripheral regions (King 1999: 153; Tomsa 2006: chapter 5.2). Golkar 
dominates the entire region east of Bali as well as West and East Kalimantan and the central 
belt of Sumatra. The PKB is particularly strong in East Java, while the PDI-P exerts much in-
fluence in Central and East Java (Kompas 2004a; Ananta, Arifin and Suryadinata 2004: 391ff.; 
Mujani and Liddle 2007). In 2004, Golkar and the PDI-P lost a high percentage of votes in 
some of their strongholds. The losses of Golkar in Sulawesi were due to the crumbling of 
                                                     
7  A party is defined here as “Islamist” when the implementation of shari’a law and the establishment of a—
mostly undefined—Islamic state are among its objectives. Some parties are more explicit in this regard, while 
others (for example, the PKS) usually do not openly express such ambitions. 
8  As do recent surveys: Lembaga Survei Indonesia (2007). 
9  On individual parties and their platforms: Kompas (2004b). 
10  But also on issues such as the pornography bill and the introduction of shari’a laws at the local level. 
16 Ufen: The Evolution of Cleavages in the Indonesian Party System 
many patronage networks inherited from the New Order. PDI-P’s disappointing showing in 
Bali was probably the result of disenchantment with the supposedly reformist party. 
Nonetheless, there is no party directly representing these regions. The proportional system 
combined with a low electoral threshold seemingly facilitates the development of a multi-
party system and thus the representation of diverse cleavages; however, the foundation of 
regionally based parties is almost impossible: only parties with branches in at least two-
thirds of the provinces and at least-two thirds of the districts in these provinces are allowed 
to participate in elections. The only exception is the province of Aceh, where regional parties 
are allowed according to the special autonomy laws. In addition, regional and ethnic identi-
ties are frequently articulated through religious affiliations. Christians in Manado, North 
Sumatra, on Flores, and Papua tend to vote for non-Islamic parties, that is, the PD, Golkar, 
the PDI-P, or the PDS. 
Furthermore, the contrast between urban-based parties such as the PD and the PKS and ru-
ral-based parties such as the PKB is obvious (see Johnson Tan 2005; Ananta, Arifin and Su-
ryadinata 2004: 391ff.; Mujani and Liddle 2007: 849). This cleavage between industrial, pro-
fessional, and trading elites on the one hand and village elites on the other is indirectly  
reflected in the antagonism between modernist Muslim and traditionalist Muslim parties. 
Once again, an economic cleavage is recast in terms of religion. 
A cleavage between “capital” and “labor” is thus barely discernible within the Indonesian 
party system (see Mujani and Liddle 2007: 850), although the cleavage strongly shaped the 
nationalist movement until the suppression of the communist uprising in 1926. In the 1950s, 
the cleavage was once again politicized with the reemergence of the PKI. It then disappeared 
almost entirely under Suharto and after 1998. It is uncertain whether the abolition of the PKI 
in 1965/66, the emasculation of trade unions until 1998, and the tabooing of leftist political 
ideologies are responsible for it. Another explanation may be the worldwide weakening of 
labor parties since the end of the Cold War. Urban-based parties such as the PD, the PKS, 
and the PAN represent middle- and upper-class interests but not necessarily those of entre-
preneurs (King 1999: 158; Ananta, Arifin and Suryadinata 2004: 396ff.; Johnson Tan 2005). 
Almost all larger parties receive the majority of their votes from the lower-class electorate 
(but especially the PDI-P and the PKB: see Ananta, Arifin and Suryadinata 2004: 392, 395) al-
though they do not represent its interests, either programmatically or in the legislature. Of 
the four “classic” cleavages, the one dividing “capital” and “labor” is the one that is least 
translated into the party system. This is surprising given the very high poverty rate. It can be 
partly ascribed to the substantial impact of foreign capital and the traditional “pariah” role 
of the powerful, yet politically marginalized and vulnerable, ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs. 
Neither group can directly enforce its interests in party politics. Some ethnic Chinese have 
adopted the role of party financiers operating discretely in the background. The close coop-
eration of the bureaucracy and the military with state-owned and private enterprises has 
generated a new pattern of collusion which obstructs the creation of policy-oriented parties 
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(Robison and Hadiz 2004: 228, 258). Independent unions have been permitted since 1998, but 
the entire sector is fragmented and linkages to political parties are relatively weak. The same 
conditions apply to peasant associations or organizations representing workers in the in-
formal sector. Differences in economic interests are thus transformed into opposites such as 
“traditionalism” versus “modernism.” This is also why powerful parties of workers, peas-
ants, or entrepreneurs do not exist. 
The 1999 elections in particular were characterized by a divide between those trying to de-
fend their privileges and to slow down the pace of reform and those wishing to accelerate 
democratization. The status-quo—reformasi cleavage, already rather weak in 1999, has been 
of minor importance in recent years (Tomsa 2006: 186; Johnson Tan 2005). Golkar and the 
PPP remain parties of the New Order and show little interest in coming to terms with the 
nation’s dark past; this is evidenced, for example, by the fact that after the 1999 elections 65 
percent of Golkar delegates and 55.3 percent of PPP delegates had already been MPs for 
their parties in the New Order (King 2003: 99). Before 1999, the PDI-P, the PKB, and the PAN 
were still considered to be part of the reform process. Their esteemed leaders—Megawati 
Sukarnoputri, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Amien Rais, respectively—had been part of the 
opposition movement against Suharto in the 1990s. Due to their wheeling and dealing after 
the first elections, they have lost much of their previous charismatic power, which was 
based on their reputations as reformers. 
3.5 Manifestations of Dealignment 
The aforementioned description, though, has to be put into perspective. In the debate on 
party preferences with respect to gender, occupation, and social class, as well as ethnic and 
religious affiliation, few “hard facts” exist. Moreover, because of multicollinearity it is not 
clear whether, for instance, the regional preferences for different parties are not related part-
ly to ethnicity (see Mujani and Liddle 2007: 851). Available data are often inconsistent and 
contradictory. With the help of surveys and correlation analyses, one can only draw pre-
liminary conclusions about the voting behavior of certain groups. 
According to Mujani and Liddle (2007), who base their findings on four national surveys 
(partly included in the database of the Comparative National Elections Project, Grid III), the 
best explanation for the strength of the relationship between party identification and the 
vote is voter familiarity with parties. They regard sociological explanations, for example 
those which reference the aliran approach, with great skepticism. In particular, they state, in 
contrast to the conventional wisdom, that the influence of Muslim religiosity on the 1999 
and 2004 vote was limited. 
With reference to direct elections of the president and local powerholders, this reasoning is 
accurate (see also: IFES 2004b), but with respect to national elections, this diagnosis has to be 
qualified. First, the authors’ operationalization of the variable “religiosity” (measured by the 
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intensity of the conduct of daily prayers, Ramadan fasting, Qur’anic recitation, and atten-
dance at religious lectures) is questionable.11 They confine religiosity to private practices, but 
it would be more helpful to investigate the social and religious milieus to which voters be-
long or their willingness to support the implementation of an Islamic state or harsh shari’a 
regulations. Such surveys are still missing, but there are opinion polls which show a huge 
part of the population demanding extensive, conservative, or even reactionary Islamization 
(Lembaga Survei Indonesia 2007). Second, there are different factions within the parties. The 
PAN and Golkar, for example, are composed of orthodox Muslims and secularists (Tomsa 
2006: chapter 5.2). A distinction between these factions in the analysis would, arguably, ren-
der different results. Third, smaller parties such as the PBB, the PBR, and the PDS are not in-
cluded in Mujani and Liddle’s database, although these parties have a much clearer reli-
gious orientation. In addition, I would argue that identification with party leaders, a very 
significant factor for forecasting voting behavior, also has to be seen as identification with 
outstanding personalities who are to a large extent defined in the public mind by their reli-
gious credentials or their resistance to political Islam. 
The above notwithstanding, the thesis of a dealignment in Indonesia, particularly with ref-
erence to religiosity, is convincing. The traditionalism-modernism cleavage is no longer so 
strictly pronounced as it previously was due to a creeping modernization of traditionalist 
lifestyles and worldviews. People belonging to the two milieus mix much more frequently. 
In the educational sector, for instance, state schools and universities tend to blur these lines. 
In addition, the distinction between abangan and santri, one of the most salient characteristics 
of Indonesian society in the 1950s, has lost much of its persuasiveness due to an Islamization 
(santrinisasi) that has transformed the whole society (Sidel 2006). 
A report by the Asia Foundation stresses the high number of swing voters (Asia Foundation 
2003: 100).12 The dealignment is further indicated by the increasing impact of “money poli-
tics,” weak loyalties towards parties, and the upsurge of new elite networks at the local level 
(Ufen 2008a: 20ff.). Particularly below the national level, many parties are subject to clientel-
ist structures, so that they do not accord with the Lipset-Rokkan ideal of mass integration 
and catch-all parties (Buehler and Johnson Tan 2007; Mietzner 2008).13 The rise of “money 
politics” has become manifest in the much-increased impact of businessmen. In the 1950s, 
Chinese enterprises were politically weak, and indigenous businessmen were not able to 
“exercise much influence on governments beyond the eliciting of immediate favors” (Feith 
1962: 105). Today, big business colludes with parliamentarians and bureaucrats at all levels 
(Robison and Hadiz 2004). 
                                                     
11  See also Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata (2004). In this case they merely differentiate between “Muslims” 
and “Non-Muslims.” 
12  For surveys before 2002 see: Johnson Tan (2002). 
13  But even in national elections some parties rely to a large degree on clientelist networks (see for instance 
Tomsa 2006: chapter 5.2). 
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In addition to these factors, the direct election of the president since 2004 fosters personalism 
and the establishment of parties as simple electoral vehicles. In this vein, Mujani and Liddle 
(2007: 850) state that “Indonesia appears to be a genuine instance of the presidentialization 
of voting behaviour in a new democracy.” The first direct presidential elections saw a per-
sonalization enhanced by the use of professional campaign advisors and the ever-increasing 
impact of mass media (IFES 2004a). Voters very often supported presidential candidates in-
dependent from party instruction (IFES 2004c). This and the direct election of governors, 
mayors, and district chiefs since 2005 have engendered a delinking of candidates and politi-
cal parties and, thus, a blurring of cleavages (Haris 2005; Ufen 2008a). 
4 Conclusions 
The national and the industrial revolution in Indonesia began late and proceeded to a large 
extent in parallel. Although most activists in the nationalist movement were from Java and 
Sumatra, they settled on an “Indonesia” which encompassed the whole archipelago and had 
a lingua franca, Malay, as its future national language. The church-state conflict was at that 
stage characterized not so much by the antagonism between the colonial rulers and the—
overwhelmingly—Muslim subjects but rather by the one between secularists and propo-
nents of a political Islam. Ultimately, the initial divides that occurred during this revolution 
were decided in favor of the secularists and a centralized, liberal democracy—a pattern 
which recurred after 1998. The industrial revolution proceeded in stages and has remained 
incomplete with reference to the Western division of “capital” and “labor.” The rural-urban 
cleavage is to a large extent expressed in religious terms; a conflict between industrialists 
and farmers is hardly translated into the party system. 
When describing the genesis of the Indonesian party system, it is useful to distinguish criti-
cal, formative phases. Against this background, the four “classic” cleavages have to be ad-
justed and others have to be added: one for the divide between reformers and status quo de-
fenders for the period from 1998 until 2000; others for the divides separating traditionalist 
and modernist Muslims on the one hand, and secularist, moderate supporters of political Is-
lam and Islamists on the other. Genuine economic cleavages (most notably “capital” versus 
“labor” and “urban” versus “rural”) are best expressed in terms of religion, ethnicity, or al-
legiance to political leaders based in a specific region. 
But how did the cleavage structure and political parties change? First, due to the eradication 
of the PKI, the suppression of the political left by the New Order regime, and the rise of 
“money politics,” which is to a large extent the legacy of the neopatrimonialism of the Su-
harto period, the capital-labor cleavage is today almost absent in the party system. Second, 
with the decline of old ideologies such as nationalism, socialism, and communism, political 
Islam has to a certain degree filled the remaining vacuum. But, third, political Islam has also 
changed. There are new bases of religious mobilization (such as the young urban profes-
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sional Islamism, as represented by the PKS), the traditionalism-modernism divide is now 
blurred, and the modernist camp is divided into a range of new parties (PAN, PBR, PBB, 
partly PPP, and Golkar). Fourth, Indonesia has witnessed historical shifts entailing periods 
of authoritarianism. A party such as Golkar, created “from above,” is a typical legacy there-
of. It gained a considerable head start but is hardly the result of social cleavages being “or-
ganically” translated into the party system. 
Political parties are different today due to a conspicuous process of dealignment. One reason 
for this is the aforementioned decline of old ideologies. New formal institutions, especially 
the direct election of the president and local officeholders, as well as the ever-increasing role 
of mass media have accelerated the dealignment process. Another factor is the rise of an in-
fluential indigenous and ethnic Chinese bourgeoisie which colludes with party leaders. 
In comparison with 1999, and particularly with the 1950s, today’s cleavages are weaker and 
more difficult to measure. Nevertheless, their strong bonds with certain social groups and 
mass organizations such as Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah signify the continuing 
stability of parties and the party system as a whole. 
If the Lipset-Rokkan approach takes into account all of these circumstances, it is well-suited 
to analyze the genesis of and the most salient features of the Indonesian party system. None-
theless, the model has to be combined with approaches that underline the importance of cli-
entelism and dealignment. 
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